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In the last year, an increasing number of news reports suggested
that Saudi Arabia is in a financial bind. Scholarships for foreign
study have been cut and government handouts lowered.
Increasingly, the Kingdom is looking to diversify its economy
and modernise its business sector. But is real development
possible within a Saudi political system in which the Royal
Family’s legitimacy is largely rooted in maintaining the status
quo? An examination of Saudi Arabia’s Shi’a-majority Eastern
Province provides some insight into that question.
The Eastern Province produces most of the country’s oil yet
enjoys significantly less development than other provinces. And
as is often the case, less development is intertwined with fewer
rights. The execution of Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr on January 2,
2016 momentarily placed an international spotlight on the
plight of Saudi Arabia’s Shi’a minority, but the story was
quickly overshadowed by the larger diplomatic fallout between
Iran and the Kingdom.
Saudi Arabia’s compartmentalised acceptance of the Shi’a
minority
How does a nation that incorporates an inherently anti-Shi’a
doctrine into official religious discourse, tolerate approximately
one million Shi’a? It does so by carefully compartmentalising its
criticism of the Shi’a. The Wahhabi establishment directs its
harshest criticism against Shi’a clerics and doctrine rather than
everyday practitioners.
This aggressive stance against Shi’a doctrine falls just short of
direct confrontation but is a symptom of the overall approach
of Riyadh to governance. The Royal Family walks a tightrope
between the liberalisation necessary for economic development
and strong political ties with the West, and the more
conservative demands of the Wahhabi movement. Saudi Arabia
effectively coopted a majority of Wahhabi scholars into the
government by employing them in official positions. However,
the demonisation of the Shi’a also plays an important role in
distracting the Wahhabi movement from what may otherwise
be perceived as Royal misdeeds. The Shi’a then have the
misfortune of serving as political scapegoats. Thus a Wahhabi-
oriented pseudo-nationalism based on the leadership of the
Royal Family acts as a unifier for Arabia’s tribal society[1] but
this is at the exclusion of the Shi’a and “the result is a
pernicious, everyday sectarianism that afflicts ordinary
citizens.”[2]
Evolution of the Shi’a response to persecution
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Evolution of the Shi’a response to persecution
Riyadh insists that all Shi’a activism in the Eastern Province is
both inspired and directed by Iran. Because the center of gravity
of Shi’a religious scholarship lies in the seminaries of Iran there
is an inevitable link between the latter and the Saudi Shi’a.
Ironically Riyadh’s prohibition against establishing a Shi’a
hawza, or seminary, only strengthened the ties between its Shi’a
population and Iran. Framing the Shi’a movement for equal
rights as an Iranian fifth column allows Riyadh to detract
attention away from other contentious issues.
Hollow olive branches
The royal pardon of exiled Shi’a activists in 1993 marked a
sharp break in the style of resistance in the Eastern Province
and the Islahiyyun or reformists were born.[1] An official
national dialogue[2] took place between Sunni and Shi’a leaders
but these initiatives have been “fundamentally cosmetic”
according to most Shi’a accounts.[3] The Gulf War and
awakening of a parallel anti-Royalist Salafi campaign known as
the Sahwa movement marked a de-Shiitisation of demands[4] as
the Shi’a movement shifted from a focus on Shi’a grievances to
demands for general rights for all Saudis.
The strategy of nationalising demands has never once worked
for the Shi’a and the Royal Family understands that any alliance
between Wahhabi reformists and the Shi’a is untenable. The
Shi’a have occasionally achieved some of their economic
demands during transitional periods of dissent in Saudi politics
but the status quo of marginalisation always returns and the
Shi’a minority remain hostage to the ebb and flow of Saudi-
Iranian relations.
Shi’a aspirations in Saudi Arabia are not radical. The right to
work, build mosques, establish seminaries, participate in
government, and worship publicly are the main Shi’a demands.
Riyadh’s traditional response to these demands is to (1) claim
that Saudi Arabia is first and foremost a Wahhabi/Sunni state
and all its subjects are held to those same standards; and (2)
justify these restrictions as necessary due to a national security
threat posed by the Shi’a.
The Royal Family has deceptively shifted its response towards
dialogue and in some cases provided state protection in order to
match newfound moderation on the part of the Shi’a. However,
the vitriolic hatred that is sanctioned by the Royal Family in
public schools and mosques channels the aggression of
Wahhabi critics away from Riyadh.
Occasional protection from this aggression that the Royal
Family extends to the Shi’a is merely a tool to remind the
Wahhabi movement of its ‘rightful’ place, beneath the wishes of
the King. Now a small number of Shi’a mosques are permitted
to exist in the Eastern Province. But is a Shi’a truly equal in
Saudi society when he may practice his faith publicly in the
small village of al-Awamiyya but will be arrested for it in
Medina? The answer is clearly that there is very little value in
official protection of certain human rights within a national
system that includes structural persecution.
When the government of Saudi Arabia remains the single largest
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When the government of Saudi Arabia remains the single largest
employer but rarely hires Shi’a then expansion of rights on
paper provides no solace. When the Shi’a reside in the richest
oil region of Saudi Arabia but most funds are diverted to other
areas then any national dialogue is rendered irrelevant. As
Booker T. Washington asked in his book Up From Slavery, “Is
it possible, and probable, that nine millions of men can make
effective progress in economic lines if they are deprived of
political rights, made a servile caste, and allowed only the most
meager chance for developing their exceptional men?”[1] His
answer was an emphatic ‘No.’
Conclusion
The case of the Shi’a of the Eastern Province is not the only
fault line within Saudi society. Divisions between radical
Salafism and royalist Wahhabis also threaten the dominion of
the Royal Family. This is in addition to the general societal
issues of the role of women, rights of foreign workers, and
ability to participate in government.
The case of the Shi’a is special in that it demonstrates the
intersection of rights and development while revealing that the
latter may be at odds with Saudi royal legitimacy. For its part,
the West bears some responsibility for the plight of all those
disenfranchised in the Saudi system. So long as the West
continues to criticise regional nations, like Iran, that allow
women in government and permit relatively-free practice of
religion but turn a blind eye to Saudi Arabia, then Riyadh
receives a green light to continue its oppression. Choosing to
deal fairly with the Shi’a of the Eastern Province is a gamble for
the Royal Family. However, if the Royal Family chooses to
prevent Saudi Arabia from developing into more than the petrol
station of the West then eventually, economic collapse will
ensue and its legitimacy will nevertheless be jeopardised.
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